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Abstract A first comparison of the innovation processes of introducing electronic
identities on a national level in Austria, Belgium, Germany and Spain, based on
extensive expert interviews with key actors, has been amended by four more country
reports from Denmark, Finland, Estonia and Sweden in order to check the validity of
generalisations derived from the first four cases. The extended comparison with the
four additional countries increases the variance between the eID systems in Europe
by showing differing technical and organisational features, such as purely software-
based solutions, e.g. in Denmark, or complete outsourcing of the eIDMs, e.g. in
Sweden. In the second part of the paper, the conceptual framework of the
comparative study, a combination of path analysis, institutional actor theory and
policy field analysis will be reflected. It has resulted in a fruitful approach allowing
for the explanation of some, but by no means all, of the differences between the
national eIDMs in Europe.
Keywords Comparative analysis . eID cards . Electronic identities . Identity
management systems . Identity cards . Path analysis . Privacy . Staatsverständnis
Background and objectives
Four empirical case studies of the introduction of electronic identities (eIDs) at the
national level in Austria, Belgium, Germany and Spain have been conducted
according to a common research design and been compared following a common
conceptual framework (Kubicek and Noack 2010). This framework combines the
actor-oriented institutional theory and policy field analysis with path analysis
IDIS (2010) 3:235–245
DOI 10.1007/s12394-010-0063-x
The paper is based on research funded by the independent Volkswagen Foundation, Germany.
H. Kubicek (*) : T. Noack




(Kubicek 2010). The empirical research has been conducted by teams in each
country by interviews of key actors according to a common interview guide. The
countries for comparison have been selected on the principle of a most similar
design (Kubicek 2010). They all have introduced a new eID for online authentication
for e-government services based on a national ID card or a similar chip-card. The
eID is defined as registered in national citizen registries based on particular
legislation and produced and distributed within an eID Management System
(eIDMS) operated by different agencies.
The findings for the studies in Austria (Aichholzer and Strauß 2010), Belgium
(Mariën and van Audenhove 2010), Germany (Noack and Kubicek 2010) and Spain
(Heichlinger and Gallego 2010) have been compared with regard to socio-technical
system features, i.e. the eIDMS, their technical, organisational and regulatory path
dependency, the main actors who have made these choices, the context in which
these decisions have been taken, in particular privacy legislation and culture as well
as “Staatsverständnis” and finally the use of the eID function for e-government
services. There are big differences between the four countries and between their
national eIDMS, which can be explained by differences between the earlier systems.
In other words, there is a high degree of path continuation or incremental innovation.
Path change or path creation could be observed in some countries where attempts
were made to react on privacy concerns which occurred to a different degree in the
four countries under comparison.
Despite the big differences between the four eIDMS, the rate of usage for online
authentication in e-government services is quite low in each case. This raises the
question whether the eIDMS, which has been introduced, was an appropriate and
effective solution to the policy problem started with. The official policy problems to
be solved were security and privacy concerns of citizens which keep them from
performing online transactions in e-government and e-commerce and thereby not
fully exploiting the potential of the Internet for economic growth and societal
progress. Looking at the functionality of the eIDMS, it becomes obvious that they
increase the security of service providers concerning the identity of their customers
but except for the German case do not increase the safety of the citizens/customers
with regard to the identity or the fulfilment of the providers of online services. As
long as other methods of online authentication, in particular user name, password
and/or one-time passwords are offered, there is no advantage for citizens to use the
eID for online authentication regardless of whether it is considered by security
experts as a stronger and more secure alternative compared to the existing methods
(Kubicek and Noack 2010).
As this is an important finding with far-reaching economic and political
implications, it is important to check its generalisability. Therefore another four
country reports have been ordered selected according to the principle of a “most
different design”, including countries such as Denmark, which has been planning to
introduce an eID card for more than 20 years (Hoff and Hoff 2010), or Sweden,
which has completely outsourced its eIDMS (Grönlund 2010). We also included
Finland, the first country to introduce an eID (Rissanen 2010) and Estonia, said to be
most successful with regard to usage rates of eID based online authentication for
e-government services (Martens 2010). Indeed the four country reports written by
experts well acquainted with the situation in their home country show relevant
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additional variations of the eIDMS with regard to technology, organisation and
regulation. However, it has to be noted that all eight countries have one thing in
common: The eID is based on an official identity registered in an obligatory national
citizen registry and these cases therefore are completely different from e.g. the
United Kingdom.
In three of the four countries the innovation process started much earlier, i.e. in
1994 in Denmark, in 1995 in Finland, in 1997 in Estonia (see Fig. 1)
Broadening the range of eIDMS
The only common feature of the national eIDs in the eight countries is their
origination from the national citizen registries, based on an obligation to register for
every citizen by birth (Table 1).
Differences between the eIDMS
While in the first sample in three out of four cases the new national ID chip-card was
chosen as the only token for the eID, in the second sample only Finland and Estonia
started with this option. However, Finland, where the ID card is not mandatory, has
opened an alternative path of accepting the bank eID for e-government as well. In
Denmark, there is no national ID card at all, and Sweden, comparable to Austria,
offers an optional ID card, which by law can be used as token for the eID, but which
is so far not being offered with this functionality.
The government-issued eIDs in Denmark and Sweden are software certificates for
digital signatures, which according to the European signature legislation are
considered to be less secure than those on chip-cards. In Sweden, they may be
placed on chip-cards, but this option accounts for less than 10% (Grönlund 2010).
The eID in the four countries in the second sample includes a unique identifier,
which is the national register number in Estonia and Sweden or a number derived
from this number in Denmark or from the social security number in Finland. Where
chip-cards are used, they employ contact chips, and these do not contain biometric
data.
Fig. 1 Timeline of development and rollout of eIDs in eight countries
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Most remarkable are differences with regard to the organisations which issue the
eIDs accepted for online authentication in e-government services: In the four
countries, banks and the eIDs accepted by banks for online banking play a dominant
role, but in different ways:
& In Denmark, the government-issued OCES eID will be merged with the
dominant bank eID and the new Nem ID, still software-based, will be issued
and administered by a bank consortium (Hoff and Hoff 2010).
& In Estonia, from the beginning, issuing of eID certificates on the national ID card
has been outsourced to a consortium of the largest bank and the largest telecom
enterprise (Martens 2010).
& In Finland the eID on an eID card did not receive any acceptance while the bank
eID in the form of One Time Passwords (OTP) boomed. The Finnish
Government therefore in 2003 opened up this path and accepts the bank eID
for online authentication for e-government services (Rissanen 2010)
& In Sweden, until recently there was no government-issued eID at all, instead
bank-issued eIDs based on a government contract are accepted for e-government
services (Grönlund 2010).
Path continuation
Similar to the other four countries, these organisational arrangements continue
previous paths and are in the regulatory tradition of the respective country—except
for Estonia which has completely cut with all the traditions dating from the Soviet
occupation and has created a new path with regard to citizens’ registration and ID
documents including eIDs (Martens 2010).
It is remarkable that neither Denmark nor Sweden changed over to the European
standards of hardware-based solutions for IDs and digital signatures, but rather
continued their software-based solutions. This shows a high degree of path
persistence.
Sweden has a long tradition of government relying on identities provided by other
organisations such as the post office. Following this tradition Sweden contracted out
the administration of the eIDs to a bank consortium (Grönlund 2010). Finland and
Denmark conducted a kind of path shift for pragmatic reasons when they failed with
their government-issued eID and saw the strong uptake of the bank eIDs. Estonia, in
creating new paths followed its Scandinavian neighbours, went for a private
consortium of the largest bank and the largest telecom enterprise. As the authors of
the Swedish and the Estonian case study emphasize, in their countries there is a
tradition of reducing government activities to the bare minimum and to contract out
many tasks that in other European countries are retained by government (Grönlund
2010, Martens 2010). At the same time there is a high trust in banks regarding data
protection (see Table 2).
Policy fields and actors constellation
One core finding from the first four cases was that eIDs are a multi-field innovation,
i.e. becoming subject of different policy fields, in particular public administration/e-
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government, public safety, industry/e-commerce and others. While in Germany and
Spain, safety and security were the most powerful policy fields leading to digital
fingerprints on the eID chip, the policy fields of public safety or security played no
role with regard to the eIDMS in the four northern European countries. This may be
one reason why the national ID cards, if there are any, do not play an important role
as the eID token and why even bank IDs are accepted for e-government services. In
the Swedish case study the greatest influence is assigned to the finance/tax policy
field, as the eID as well as the national registry are under the authority of the
Ministry of Finance (Grönlund 2010).
With regard to the actors constellation, the most significant difference between the
countries in the first and the second sample concerns the role of the banking sector
and the strategy that governmental actors developed in this respect.
In Belgium, Germany and Spain governmental actors considered banks as one of
many service providers who might accept the eID-based authentication for their
online services in addition to their propriety and less secure methods. When the
banks showed little interest this did not lead to any changes of the governmental
system. In Austria government could win the banks to provide their chip cards as
one of several tokens for the national eID (“Bürgerkarte”) but had not included them
in the development process nor reacted to the recent fading out of this option by
some banks which no longer are promoting the eID (Aichholzer and Strauß 2010). In
contrast, the four countries in the second sample cooperated in different ways and
relied on the banking sector: Sweden contracted the whole eIDMS out to a bank
consortium, Estonia to a consortium of a bank and a telco enterprise, Denmark
merged its governmental issued eID with the bank ID and hands this over to a bank
consortium and Finland, besides its government-issued eID, accepted the bank eID
for online authentication in e-government services. This is most remarkable as all
bank issued eIDs are either employing One-Time-Passwords or software certificates,
both considered to be less secure than chip card based solutions in a PKI
environment.
“Staatsverständnis” and privacy
The above-mentioned strong tendency for contracting out the eIDMS and only
running the central citizen registry is the result of a particular “Staatsverständnis”,
which looks after cost reduction wherever possible and reduces the government’s
tasks to the minimum. In Austria, Belgium, Germany or Spain, neither political
parties nor the public would accept national eIDs being issued by banks or other
private businesses. There is a north-south difference, calling for further explanation
which, however is beyond the scope of this study.
With regard to privacy, at first glance, we expected a similar legislation and
culture in Denmark and Sweden, but we found big differences with regards to the
eIDMS. In Denmark, early attempts to introduce a digital citizen card failed because
of privacy concerns (see Hoff and Hoff 2010) while in Sweden the government
contracted the eIDMS to the private sector and did not demand any privacy
enhancing provisions (see Grönlund 2010).
Most notable are differences regarding the use of the unique personal identity
number which all four countries have. As this number in Denmark, and likewise the
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Social Security Number in Finland, includes the date of birth and a code for the sex
of the holder, its use for authentication purposes by non-governmental agencies is
considered a privacy risk. Therefore both countries do not allow the direct use of the
original number in the software certificate in Denmark and on the eID card in
Finland, but rather produced a derived, non-speaking ID number for the eID (see
Hoff and Hoff 2010 and Rissanen 2010). In Sweden and Estonia, the use of the
original national number did not raise any concerns and no provisions were taken.
These differences between the eIDMS do not perfectly match with available data
on general privacy governance or survey data on trust in different institutions
(Table 2). Eurobarometer statistics of 2008 show that citizens in Finland, Denmark
and Sweden much more frequently said that they trust their tax authorities regarding
data privacy of their personal data than the Austrian, Belgian, German and Spanish
citizens. The data on the average trust in different governmental institutions,
including local authorities and social security (column (3), however do not show
similar differences between the countries. Trust in data privacy provided by banks,
again in the northern countries, is much higher. This may be one reason why the
stronger involvement of banks in the northern countries did not raise any concerns.
However we cannot explain the different regulation regarding the use of the
National register or Social Security Number between Denmark and Finland on the
one hand and Sweden and Estonia on the other, as a reaction to stronger privacy
concerns, as we did with regard to the differences between Austria and Germany vis
a vis Belgium and Spain (see Kubicek and Noack 2010). Rather, it could be the
reverse: Finnish citizens perceive a high level of personal data protection and
therefore have few general concerns regarding data privacy. Danish data show a high
level of data protection but also much more concerns of citizens. Estonian citizens
report a lower level of protection and are more frequently concerned. In all four














































DE 66 69 68 65 67 46
BE 76 80 74 22 72 63
AT 69 71 72 70 67 62
ES 76 80 63 35 69 48
FI 92 88 92 5 68 84
SE 91 85 84 46 73 63
DK 94 84 90 45 65 85
EE 74 65 81 20 54 48
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countries the respective eIDMS, even where employed for several years, leave a
similar degree of concerns regarding data privacy in the internet in general.
Take-up and usage
Finland shows a similarly low usage rate of the government-issued eID as Austria,
Belgium and Spain (Table 3). The government-issued eID had to compete with a less
secure but much more popular bank eID, which has finally been accepted for e-
government services as well. Only Estonia can record a relatively high usage rate of
the national chip card based eID, which is issued by a private consortium, does not
have any privacy provisions but can be used for many e-government services,
including electronic voting in national elections (see Martens 2010). As the usage
rate in the view of the consortium is still low, and as banks are part of this
consortium, only recently have they started to make the parallel existing OTP
authentication for online banking less attractive.
Remarkable are the usage rates in Denmark and Sweden of the software based
eIDMS, reaching 18,8% in Denmark and 24,4% in Sweden with increasing trends.
This calls for reflection on the general policy approach taken and already questioned
in the comparative analysis of the four countries in the first sample. Are chip card
based stronger authentication methods an effective solution to safety and privacy
concerns of citizens, which make them refrain from using the Internet for online
transactions in e-government and e-commerce? In our first comparative analysis
(Kubicek and Noack 2010) we argued that the dominant one-sided authentication
methods in Austria, Belgium and Spain — Germany being the exception — may
enhance the security for the service provider but not for the citizen/customer and
thereby do not offer any advantage for the additional investment. Now we may add,
that even where citizens accept the need for stronger authentication against their
service providers they do not accept the more complex and expensive methods,
which provide for the most security. Software-based authentication methods are
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considered to be stronger than username/password based methods but less secure
than chip card based methods (possession and knowledge). But this seems not to be
the most important criterion for citizens. They appreciate that software certificates
can be downloaded at no extra cost, do not require a card reader or driver software,
and are not bound to other tokens with a different validity period and additional
functions.
Reflecting the conceptual approach
For the comparative analysis of European eIDMS, a conceptual framework has been
developed which combines the institutional actor theory for policy field analysis
with path analysis from technology-related social science research, expecting a
mutual fruitful gain of insight (Kubicek 2010). Traditional path analysis most of all
claims the strong influence of history and does not look in detail at the actors taking
decisions on the development. By introducing the options of path continuation, path
change, path creation and path merger with regards to a technical, organisational and
regulatory path, we were able to describe in a comparative way the choices political
actors could take with regard to the national eIDMS and thereby fill the gap which
the institutional actors theory presents, i.e. the undefined subject of the policy
problem and policy solution (Scharpf 2000). Introducing path analysis into the actor-
oriented institutional analysis allows concentrating on the cases of path change or
path creation. In this regard the contextual approach introduced by Mayntz and
Schneider (1988) becomes relevant. The assumption that privacy legislation and
culture as well as “Staatsverständnis” can explain the differences between the
solutions chosen could be observed but not validated by strong empirical correlation,
as privacy governance or privacy culture are hard to operationalise across different
European cultures.
Within this view, path changes and path creation have to be explained while path
continuation is the default assumption with reference to the previous system.
However, in a more comprehensive comparative analysis one would like to know the
reasons for the differences between the previous systems as well, i.e. why is there an
obligation to hold an ID card in some countries but not in others, why do some have
a universal identity number which is openly used, while others restrict its use, and
why does a third group of countries ban such a number altogether? To answer these
questions, historical research is needed which goes beyond the available, more
eclectic and anecdotal studies of the history of citizens registration, passports and
other ID documents available so far.
Finally with regard to diffusion and usage, Rogers’ theory has proven able to
explain low take-up and usage quite well (Rogers 2003). The eIDs do not provide
sufficient additional value to citizens, in particular as long as other methods for
authentication are offered. This competitive factor in Rogers’ theory does not play
such an important role as it did in the case of online authentication. However, Porter,
in his analysis of competitive strategies emphasizes substitute products as a relevant
threat (Porter 1998). In this regard we note that authentication for online banking is
an important influencing factor for eIDs and that in all countries under comparison
banks are not ready to employ the stronger authentication offered by chip-based
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eIDs. On the contrary, some governments drew back their commitment for
introducing this kind of stronger authentication and accept the weaker methods of
online banking. Therefore it would be an interesting question for another study not
only to take a closer look at the different strategies governments deploy in respect of
the banking sector but also to compare and explain the high degree of path
continuation in online banking authentication.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
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